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Read between the lines: Board gender diversity, family ownership, and risk‐
taking in Indian high‐tech firms 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the effect of board gender diversity on firm risk-taking level. Drawing on 
the contingency framework, we contend that the influence of women executives on firm outcomes 
like risk taking depends largely on the organizational context of the firm such as the industry in 
which it operates. To investigate this proposition, we compare the influence of board gender 
diversity on firm risk-taking level in Indian high-tech and in non-high-tech sectors. Our findings 
indicate that female executives operating in high-tech sectors take more risk than their counterparts 
female executives who operate in non-high sector. Interestingly, our analysis also reveals that 
family ownership negatively moderates the impact of female executives on risk-taking in high-
tech firms. In additional analysis, we find that female executives exert a positive impact on firm 
performance only in high-tech sector. This suggests that the influence of female executives on firm 
outcomes is not always straightforward. 
Keywords: Board Gender Diversity; Risk-Taking; High-Tech Sector; Uncertainty 
JEL Code: G30; G32; G34; C23  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Boardroom gender diversity has become an important topic on academic and social grounds in 
recent years. Previously considered as a social issue and a matter of repute, women representation 
on board is increasingly perceived as a value-driven for firms (Terjesen and Sealy, 2016). 
Consequently, there has been increased social and regulatory pressure on firms to include more 
women directors in their boardrooms. A burgeoning evidence shows that gender diversity on 
boards positively influences value creation in the organization by bringing a broader, fresher, and 
different voice to the table and linking organizations to different external constituencies (Carter et 
al., 2015; Saeed et al., 2016), which in turn affects firm productivity and performance (Green and 
Homroy, 2018; Sarhan et al., 2018; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
One of the potential channels through which gender diverse board can influence firm 
performance is the risk choices it makes. A gender diverse board broadens the boards’ perspective 
by offering benefits from skills, experiences and backgrounds of diverse members which facilitate 
in corporate decision making process, including risk taking (Saeed et al., 2016).Empirical 
evidences examining the direct relationship between directors’ gender and risk-taking, however, 
remains equivocal at best, as some studies report negative or no effect of women executives on 
firm risk-taking (e.g., Wahid, 2018;Chen et al., 2017;Levi et al., 2014), while others indicate 
positive impact (Bernile et al, 2018; Green and Homroy, 2018; Adams and Funk, 2012; Berger et 
al. 2014). The inconclusive results lead researchers to suggest that rather than examining a direct 
relationship between gender diversity and risk-taking, variables surrounding this relationship must 
be examined (e.g., Bernile et al, 2018; Berger et al., 2014; Bargeron et al., 2010; Miller & Triana, 
2009). That indicates, the influence of women executives on risk-taking may, at least in part, 
depends on the organizational contingencies. Importance of organizational circumstances in which 
women achieve executive positions is discussed in recent literature (Willey and Monllor-Tormos, 
2018; Adams et al., 2009), however, research examining the role organizational context plays in 
shaping the outcome of gender diverse board is very limited. 
In line with this research stream, it is submitted that contextual factors are important 
because these are susceptible to change (Maxfield et al., 2010) and firms operating in different 
industries experience different set of economic and environmental constraints such as technology 
development, competition and regulations. Therefore, they differ in terms of their basic attributes 
like growth opportunities, profit margins, financial risk, and research and development intensity 
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(Gavious et al., 2012), which ultimately effect on level of risk taking (Fernández and Nieto, 2006;). 
These sectoral differences appear more starkly when looking at risk-taking in high-tech sector. 
High-tech sector is characterized by innovation and uncertainty. Specially, firms in this sector 
encounter uncertainty regarding consumer demand and rapid development in technology. Further, 
these firms are inclined towards high-risk strategic investments (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, 
backward or forward integration) due to the hyper-competitive pressure (Willey and Monllor-
Tormos, 2018).Collectively, the joint characteristics of uncertainty and complexity of the 
innovation process make the risk-takingas a requirement of the industry. So, women directors are 
also coerced to follow the risk-taking behavior. Hence, the high-tech sector provides a most 
appropriate setting to test the impact of board gender diversity on risk-taking.  
Recent studies have also shown that firm risk-taking propensity is significantly affected by 
the firm’s ownership. A large scholarship maintains that family ownership structure leads firms to 
risk-avoiding decisions (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al. 2017; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007;Tsao and Lien, 
2013; Abdullah et al., 2016). There are reasons to believe for such assertion. Firstly, in family 
firms, owners are the large shareholders (investors) of the firm and have to bear the full financial 
burden of unsuccessful investments. So, risky decisions are generally avoided to protect the family 
wealth (Souder et al, 2017; Naldi et al., 2007). Secondly, their investment is tied closely to their 
firm that makes the diversification of their investment portfolios difficult (Poletti-Hughes and 
Willaia, 2017;Tsao and Lien, 2013). Consequently, the undiversified nature of investment 
portfolio leads family firms to take less risk. Thirdly, family businesses are more geared to long-
term survival and aim to keep the business within the hands of the family. This may lead family 
firms to risk-avoiding decisions as higher risk could endanger the goal of business succession and 
business survivability (Poletti-Hughes and Willaia, 2017; Hiebl, 2012).We formally incorporate 
this idea by focusing on the moderating role of family ownership structure in the relationship 
between board gender diversity and risk-taking in high-tech sector. 
This study innovates in several ways. Firstly, it takes a more direct approach to the study 
of women directors' influence on firm risk-taking by focusing on the high-tech sector which is 
characterized by innovation and uncertainty. One closely related study is of Sila et al, (2016) that 
investigates the influence of board gender diversity on risk taking in the US and found negative 
effects. We extend this work by using contingency perspective and emphasize on industrial factors 
of high-tech sector which influence female director’s risk-taking behavior in terms of Altman’s Z-
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score, leverage, R&D expenditure and variance in return on assets. Moreover, we investigate how 
this relationship varies across family and nonfamily firms. In additional analysis, we estimate the 
impact of women directors’ contribution on corporate ultimate outcome- performance. We conduct 
this study in a context of large emerging economy India, which has different socio-culture and 
regulatory environment to US. Secondly, how does this relationship differ across firm ownership 
structure? We add to the family business literature by specifically testing the relationship between 
women on board and corporate risk-taking across family and non-family high-tech firms. Unlike 
non-family firms with dispersed ownership, conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders do 
not take place in family firms but higher equity ownership of family members negatively 
influences their propensity to take risk (John et al., 2008). Hence, it is more likely for family firms 
to invest more conservatively. This pattern of conservative financial policies would probably bind 
women as well as men directors to avoid risk. Taken together, by considering contextual factors 
(industry and ownership), we heed the call earlier researchers (e.g., Zona et al., 2013) who 
emphasized the importance of context and asserted that outcomes of board of directors must be 
evaluated with reference to contingency variables. As an additional analysis, we also test that how 
presence of women directors affects firm performance in high-tech sector. Thirdly, we answer 
these questions by employing the data from an emerging economy India which has received 
much attention recently on the prowess of its high-tech sector. In the last decade, India has revealed 
surprising strength in skill-intensive tradable services, including software development, 
information technology-enabled services (business-process-outsourcing), biotechnology, 
electronics, pharmaceuticals and healthcare. More importantly, considering the fact that much of 
the prior research in board gender diversity and risk taking is Western based, our study extends 
existing research to a rich and complex context beyond that of developed countries. Lastly, we use 
first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique and alternatively 
propensity-score matching technique, to control the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects 
and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Related studies on board gender diversity and risk-taking 
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Diversity in values and views may help improving board decision-making by increasing the 
number of alternatives considered, the quality of ideas as well as different aspects of the issues at 
hand (Carter et al., 2010). Gender diversity on boards is a valuable source of knowledge and 
expertise for formulating and assessing firm strategic decisions which includes corporate risk 
taking. There is an increasing literature analyze the effect of gender on risk taking at corporate 
board level. For example, using a cross-sectional sample of the boards of directors of publicly 
traded US firms, Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that woman directors prefer to have a lower 
risk in financial decision-making, therefore firms with fewer female directors experience more 
variability in their stock returns. This effect leads to the confirmation of woman board members 
as tough monitors. Liao et al.(2015) show that companies having female directors disclose more 
environment related information to avoid litigation risk. Pak and Gul (2011) examine the link 
between gender diversity in US boardrooms and corporate risk taking. They anticipated women as 
risk aversive on the basis of the finding of gambling experiments, contextual environmental 
experiment and field studies such as of Eckel and Grossman (2008). Study reveals that corporate 
risk taking, proxied by R&D expenditure and capital expenditure, is lower for firms having a 
gender diverse board. Drawing on the sample of emerging market firms, Saeed et al. (2016) find 
that board gender diversity negatively associates with risk taking in Indian listed firms. Chen et al. 
(2017) find that gender diverse boards are more cautious about reputational risks associated with 
aggressive tax strategies. Levi et al. (2014) also support this notion that women directors avoid 
risky and challenging situations. Accordingly, they postulated the negative relationship between 
women board members in relation to initiating bids acquisition and size of bid premium. Using 
acquisition bids by S&P 1500 companies, they find support for their assertion and show that firms 
with female directors are less likely to pursue acquisitions and if they do, pay lower bid premium.  
In sharp contrast, there are some studies showing positive or no relation between board 
gender composition and firm risk-taking. Using a sample of Tunisian firms, Loukil and Yousfi 
(2015) hypothesized and subsequently found that state appointed women directors discourage risk 
taking by adopting conservative investment polices of state. They attribute their finding to the fact 
that government is more likely to invest in less risky investment project to make sure to spare funds 
for public welfare spending. In a recent work, Gull et al. (2018) find that presence of women 
directors in the boardroom decreases the level of earning management. They attribute their finding 
to the risk aversion, strong monitoring and different decision making style of women directors. 
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However, this effect disappears when other characteristics are also considered. Berger et al. (2014) 
proposed the both negative and positive gender hypothesis and observed the increase in portfolio 
risk with higher proportion of female executives on board in German banks. They further explain 
their results by reporting that heterogeneous board members are more influenced by diverse 
experiences and perspectives which enable a more thorough decision. Such extensive analysis of 
decisions helps in reducing risk in portfolio selection. Adam and Funk (2012) have taken into 
account gender differences in boardrooms by comparing value priorities and attitudes towards risk 
and documented that females differ in most in relation to values and risk attitudes to males. 
Specifically, they report that women directors care more about stimulation, and less about security, 
conformity and tradition, therefore tend to take more risky decisions than their male counterparts. 
Khaw et al., (2016) reveal that risk-taking activities amongst Chinese firms generally increases 
with the presence of male-only boards, however this relationship reverses with the state-
ownership. Finally, Sila et al., (2016) anticipated the negative relationship between gender 
diversity at board level and corporate risk taking while relying on the experimental studies in the 
relevant literature. Initially, their study finds a negative relationship which disappears when 
suitable econometric technique has been applied. 
2.2. Contingency framework 
The inconsistency across empirical results (as discussed above) is partly due to the differences in 
organizational environment in which risk-taking is considered. As Pak and Gul (2011) note that 
gender-specific risk propensity tend to vary over context and researchers could benefit from deeper 
firm level probing to better evaluate how the particulars of each industry and country impact on 
managerial risk taking behavior. Meta-analysis conducted by Byrnes et al. (1999) of more than 
150 studies on gender differences in risk-taking also reveals a lack of consideration of context.  
In this perspective, contingency perspective (Fiedler, 1967) suggests that there is no 
universal management approach to manage the organization, and management styles tend to be 
contingent upon the characteristics of the firm’s external environment. Fundamentally, 
contingency perspective stresses on environmental, organizational structural and strategic 
contingencies. According to this theory, industry attributes and institutional characteristics are 
main constituents of environmental contingencies, whereas organizational structural contingencies 
depend on firm size and ownership structure. Several studies link the contingency factors to board 
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structure and their decisions, and report substantial differences in board decisions across various 
business environments (e.g., Willey and Monllor-Tormos, 2018; Carter et al., 2015; Millerand 
Triana,2009).  
2.3. Hypothesis development 
Corporate risk taking literature indicates that organizational contingencies play an important role 
in women behavior towards risk taking (Byrnes et al. 1999 and references therein). Weber et al. 
(2002) suggest that the evidence indicating women as risk averse must be interpreted cautiously 
as managerial risk attitudes tend to vary over environments. Firms operating in different industries 
experience different set of economic and environmental contingencies (Maxfield et al., 2010). For 
example, if a firm is operating in an industry where innovation is a requirement, female executives 
of that company tends to take more risk through investing in R&D just to sustain in the market. 
Moreover, industries are subject to different challenges within technology development, 
environmental regulations, etc.  
Risk taking in the high-tech sector has perhaps been the most visible and is perceived as 
being a requirement of the industry (Balkin et al., 2000). The high-tech is an innovative industry 
which offers more uncertain environment as compared to traditional industries mainly due to 
uncertainty of external environment, the complexity of production, and the limit of business 
activities. Furthermore, the high-tech firms have relatively small amount of fixed assets and have 
strong market outlook (Talberg et al., 2008). Chen (2003) articulates that the risk of high-tech 
sector mainly manifested as the development risk, high information asymmetry, and agency 
problems because large part of their investment is in intangibles rather than assets-in-place. 
Similarly, Zhang (2007) considers that the high-tech industrial development requires a large and 
long investment cycle which increases the high losses and high-yield duality. Generally, 
investment in high-tech sector —which mostly takes in the form of R&D expenditures— is viewed 
as high risk investment compared to investment carried out in non-high-tech industries that appears 
as capital expenditures on property, plant, and equipment (e.g., Pak and Gul, 2010).    
A central element of agency theory is the assumption that agency problems may influence 
corporate risk taking propensity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Literature drawing on agency 
problems show that managers are biased towards risky projects and less likely to undertake risky 
decisions due to career concerns (Narayanan, 1985), concerns about near-term stock prices (Stein, 
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1989), and herding behavior (Zwiebel, 1995). If the agency problem is severe then directors are 
more likely to prefer low risk investment strategiesavoid innovative activity in favor of less 
risky forms of investments.  
Given that women bring different underlying values and management style (Bogac et al, 
2018; Carter et al., 2010) therefore a gender diverse board is assumed as a strong monitor (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), which aids in reducing agency problems in corporate decisions. Earlier studies 
provide evidence that the presence of women in boardroom improve the board’s monitoring and 
control functions (e.g., Sila et al. 2018; Carter et al., 2010). For example, Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) show that female directors in US firms are 3.5 percent more likely to be appointed in 
monitoring related committees such as audit, and corporate governance committees due to efficient 
monitoring. Srinidhi et al. (2011) show that gender diverse board offers a better oversight of 
manager’s reporting which leads to reduced information asymmetry between firm and financial 
market. Empirical evidence has already shown a negative relationship between agency problem 
and corporate risk taking (e.g., Zwiebel, 1995; Stein, 1989). Therefore, if board gender diversity 
leads to a reduction in the agency problems (which are prevalent in high-tech firms), we expect a 
positive link between the gender diversity and corporate risk taking.  
Yet, a vigilant monitoring may not be enough: effective leadership to encourage and 
facilitate initiatives involving risk is also required. Women are found to have different professional 
experiences and insights (Hillman et al., 2007; Abdullah et al. 2016), exhibit more innovativeness 
(Miller & Triana, 2009) and possess transformational leadership style (Eagly et al., 2001). Owing 
to these characteristics, women directors may support initiatives involving risk within the 
organization by recognizing, encouraging and rewarding innovation (Miller & Triana, 2009). 
Specifically, they do so by encouraging diversity of opinion and by undertaking innovative 
projects (Bundy, 2002), while displaying individual consideration for employees provides a 
protective environment (tolerance for short-term losses and reward for long-term success) so that 
organization takes risks. This might be especially important for high-tech setting where innovation 
is the primary performance criteria.  
A context-specific argument in support for the positive relationship between gender diverse 
board and risk taking can also be drawn from the supply-side of expertised female executives in 
high-tech sector in India. According to a study conducted in Indian four technology-hub cities 
found that girls are far less fearless of science and technology subjects than boys, and science 
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subjects do not considered as unfeminine (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). Similarly, regarding the 
workforce gender parity in the high-tech sector of India, an industry report of American Society 
of Engineering Education shows an increasing trend in the percent of women in the technology 
sector of India, and reveals that the number of female engineers employed in India has surpassed 
the US (Poster, 2013). Jonge (2014) also reports the higher proportion of female workforce and its 
positive effect on the representation of women on the boards for Indian high-tech firms. The 
implication is that women directors in high-tech sector of India are selected from a larger pool of 
talented female executives and their ‘higher expertise’ lessens gender-based risk aversion. On the 
basis of our discussion, we may suggest that high-tech firms having gender diverse boards maintain 
a positive relationship with corporate risk-taking. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking 
in Indian high-tech firms. 
Firm ownership structure shapes the corporate governance environment in which female directors 
operate and take decisions which involves risk (Wang et al. 2018). So, the impact of women 
directors on corporate risk taking is likely to be contingent on the firm’s ownership. Noticeably 
these ownership forms include family ownership that is commonly observed in emerging 
economies like India.  
From the agency problem’s perspective, we can expect that ability of women directors to 
do effective monitoring would be lower in family firms compared to nonfamily firms which 
reduces the corporate risk taking. Family firms may have coordination problems, as Block (2012, 
p.253) describes family firms as ‘fertile fields for conflicts’. These conflicts may originate from 
sibling rivalry, identity conflict, or different goals of individual family members about the 
development of organization (Schulze et al., 2003). Such internal family conflicts cause additional 
coordination problems and make monitoring more difficult. In such environment, effective 
monitoring would become more difficult for women directors which ultimately deteriorate the 
risk-taking environment of the firm. Additionally, family firms have a different set of agenda and 
commitment to the organization as compared to nonfamily firms. Miller et al. (2017) explain that 
family members have strong emotional attachment to the firm, have intention to protect of own 
investment, take business as an extension of the family and protect business for future descendants, 
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therefore, they avoid any risky decision which endanger their objectives. Such environment 
discourages gender diverse board to take risky decisions.    
On the other hand, there are also strong reasons to believe that the impact of board gender 
diversity on corporate risk taking will be weaker in family owned high-tech firms. Risky financial 
decisions are generally avoided in family firms due to concerns about the safety of the family 
wealth stemming from the undiversified investment portfolios and to protect the business 
succession (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Naldi et al., (2007) further suggest that owners are the 
large stakeholder of the firm and have to bear the full financial burden of unsuccessful investments. 
Resultantly, decisions that involve higher risk are generally evaded to protect the family wealth 
(Souder et al, 2017). Risk-averse and conformist family owned firms are less likely to include 
women on boards because such inclusion is high risk move (Abdullah et al., 2016). However, if 
such firms do nominate woman director they prefer nomination from within their circles —
preferably within families— as a mean of reducing risk. These insiders tend to avoid growth 
oriented activities which involve risk due to personal gains and losses associated with the decision 
(Wright et al., 1996). Anecdotal evidence from emerging markets, particularly India, shows that 
women family members frequently hold the board positions. For instance, PriyaAgarwal is a board 
member of her father’s company, Cairn Energy India; IshaAmbani serves on the board of her 
family firm, Reliance Industries; JayantiChauhan is the director at her family enterprise Bisleri; 
and AshniBiyani is the member of her family enterprise Future Group’s board. Such pattern of 
appointing women directors in family firms is also observed by Srinivasan and George (2013) 
which suggest that selection of women directors on Indian family firms is largely based on 
individual’s belonging to the family. Regarding the effect of women directors in family firms, 
Sarkar and Selarka (2015) provide evidence from the Indian market and show that the positive 
effect of women directors on firm performance weakens in family owned firms. Similar finding is 
observed by Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera (2014) in Spanish context and report a significant 
negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking for family owned 
businesses. Importantly, regardless of female directors are family connected or not, such cautious 
selection of female director creates an environment which discourages gender-diverse board to 
take risks in investment decisions. Thus, the positive dynamics of a diverse board, mentioned in 
the last section, is obstructed by family ownership. Based on these accounts, we may construe that 
female representation in family firms in Indian market is associated with risk-averse decisions. 
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Thus, we expect that effect of board gender diversity on risk taking is likely to be weaker in family 
owned high-tech firms. 
Hypothesis 2: Family ownership negatively moderates the relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm risk-taking in Indian high-tech firms as compared to non-high-tech firms. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Context  
Women comprise 48.5% of Indian population and their overall participation in Indian labor force 
(female-to-male ratio) is 34% (World Economic Forum, 2016). The further breakdown shows that 
women employment in organizations comprises of 26% of total employees, off these 9% of women 
present in mid-to-senior managerial positions and only 5% reach to executive positions 
(McKinsey, 2012).This phenomenon of reduced pool of female candidate which is basically the 
attrition of females as one climbs up the corporate ladder is termed as the ‘leaking pipeline’. It is 
attributed to glass ceilings that prevent the development of a successful executive career, and 
institutional stereotype practices that built on the historical perspective of norms, culture and 
identities associated with male and female in the society (Cook and Glass, 2014).Due to severe 
problem of leaking pipeline, India has highest women drop out ratio, 45.9%, between junior and 
middle level position amongst Asian countries and, therefore India left with smaller pool of women 
to move up on the corporate ladder (Sarkar and Selarka, 2015). Therefore, women representation 
on corporate board has been persistently low in India (around 5%). 
The gender disparity varies across industrial sectors. In particular, presence of women in 
manufacturing sector is around 17%, whereas the proportion of women in the labor force is higher 
in the Indian technology sector, such as software and IT 35.3%, pharma and health care 41%, and 
telecom and allied sectors 29.3%, as reported in Indian skills report (2016). A recent research 
report in year 2017, Gender Skilled Migration and IT-GSM-IT (2017) by Open University, also 
shows that female students’ participation rate in postgraduate courses in computing and IT is 
46.8% in academic year 2014-15 in India, which is higher than UK. These statistics suggest the 
availability of a large pool of women in high-tech sector that can ultimately affect the proportion 
of ready-for-the-board women.  
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3.2. Data 
This study relies on data obtained from firms listed on National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) 
during the period 2008-2014. All companies listed on BSE/NSE have to comply with the reporting 
standard of Indian-GAAP IAS. This standard is well-established and makes certain that the 
financial data are presented in a similar and fair way for each listed company. The financial data 
and information on board members is hand-collected from the corporate annual reports. We use 
an unbalanced panel dataset since this type of panel structure has the benefit of partially mitigating 
potential selection and survival bias problems.  
Following Bosworth and Collins (2007), and Winters and Yusuf (2007)we include firms 
related to health sciences, information technology, telecom, automobile and electronics in high-
tech sample. We start with top 250 listed firms based on market capitalization as of 2008 with non-
missing values for important variables. The data availability in financial reports differs greatly 
across firms, with better coverage for higher market capitalization firms. Importantly, the company 
information is richer for recent years, while, firm information beyond 4-5 years is very limited. 
This is particularly true in the case of information on 'R&D' and ‘Board members and Officers’. 
Such data-coverage is more prominent for firms having high market capitalization. Thus, we use 
market capitalization as firm selection criteria and retrieved data for top 250 firms. Additionally, 
we apply instrumental regression method (explained in the next section) for which, minimum three 
firm-year observations are required to capture the variability in the firm’s risk taking behavior. 
After applying the above mentioned restrictions we are left with the sample of 60 high-tech firms 
comprising 394 observations. Following Balkin et al. (2000) we obtain a corresponding control 
sample, for which firm size (total assets) is used as the matching criterion. For matching, we use 
range of 80% to 120% of assets of firm in high-tech sample to get the corresponding firm in non-
high-tech sample. By doing this, we allow one non-high-tech firm for each high-tech firm of 
comparable size in the control sample. The size criterion ensures that we match firms having 
comparable amount of resources to fund R&D investment and to appoint women directors on 
board. Subsequently, using the same sample selection filters, control sample consists of 61firms 
(382 firm-year observations) from non-high-tech and non-financial industries is selected. This 
approach allows us flexibility to conduct the regression analysis on full sample and subsequently 
to conduct the regression analysis on split samples of high-tech and control samples. 
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3.3. Variable measurement  
Dependent variable: Firm’s risk taking behavior is taken as dependent variable in this study, which 
is measured by using three measures of risk taking: Altman’s Z-score (inverse), leverage and 
Research and Development (R&D) expenditure. Altman’s Z-score reflects the higher probability 
of bankruptcy. Notion of the Altman’s Z-score is that higher risk taking increases the chance of 
bankruptcy. We construct Z-score by following the widely used index defined by Altman (1968). 
Altman’s Z-score index to predict bankruptcy for firm is: Z-score = 1.2(Working capital/Total 
assets)+1.4(Retained earnings/Total assets)+3.3(Earnings before interest and taxes/Total 
assets)+0.6(Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities)+ 0.999(Sales/Total assets). 
However, Z-score moves in the opposite direction to predict the probability of bankruptcy. 
Therefore, we take the inverse of the Z-score to make it comparable with other risk taking proxies. 
Other studies such as Nakano and Nguyen (2012) also follow the same method to use Altman’s Z-
score as a proxy of risk-taking. Our second proxy is leverage which captures the riskiness of 
financing decisions. The underlying idea of using leverage as a proxy for risk taking is that higher 
leverage increases the odds of risk to default. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by total 
assets (Sila et al, 2016). Our third measure is R&D investment which is carried out for firm’s 
innovative activities and considered as risky and unpredictable investment (Holmstrom, 1989). 
Previous literature has established that firm R&D spending is an appropriate proxy for the firm’s 
risk taking (Bargeron et al., 2010; Miller & Triana, 2009; Balkin et al., 2000). R&D expenditure 
was extracted from the Annexure- I of Director’s report attached in the Annual Report of the 
company. Second proxy used in this study to measure firm risk taking is. Other proxies used in the 
robustness analysis for risk taking includes standard deviation of ROA that is calculated as the 
volatility of a firm’s return on assets over six-years period. ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interests and taxes to total assets. Standard deviation of ROA is largely used in the literature 
to measure the firm risk taking behavior (e.g. Sila et al., 2016; Miller & Triana, 2009; Miller and 
Bromiley, 1990). We also used capital expenditure and σROA as alternative proxies for firm risk 
taking. Capital expenditure is measured as net capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
Independent variables: Board gender diversity is our main independent variable which is measured 
as a percentage of female directors on board. This definition is consistent with the prior studies 
such as Carter et al (2010) and Miller & Triana (2009).In particular, we are considering women 
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board of directors which include both executive and non-executive directors.Data for board gender 
diversity was taken from the corporate governance report attached in the firm’s Annual Report. To 
identify the gender composition of the board, we looked for the first names of the directors in each 
year. Additionally, we also considered titles placed prior to the names of board members such as 
Ms., Mrs. to identify women directors.In case of any ambiguity persisted in the name, we 'Googled' 
such gender-ambiguous names.  
It was a difficult task to segregate the family firms and non-family firms in India. Majority 
of firm owners were started business as family business. Latter, they have turned their small 
businesses into large corporations. Accordingly, their equity ownership may not remain as 
majority shareholders but the significant presence of promoter family (founder of a business) on 
board is still there and it has been observed while extracting data. The reasons of diminishing of 
ownership may lies in fulfillment of listing and corporate governance obligations or may be for 
firm’s financing purposes. Therefore, identifying family firms only on the basis of equity 
ownership is not relevant in Indian perspective. It is possible that, though they don’t have 20% 
equity ownership (Abdullah et al., 2016) according to shareholding pattern given in the annual 
report but they can control the decision making of the firm due to their significant presence on the 
board from a single family. Therefore we have established two different thresholds to ascribe the 
firm as family firm. First, following (Abdullah et al., 2016; Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 
2014)a family firm is defined as if firm having 20% or more equity ownership lies with the family. 
Second, if firm has two or more than two board members from the same family thereby influencing 
the board decisions (Alam and Shah, 2013), although they may not have the 20% equity ownership 
according to shareholding pattern planted in the annual reports is also considered as family firm. 
We can identify family members by using their last name as criteria to identify by following (Chu, 
2009).  It is not difficult to identify the family members in the Indian context because their last 
names generally indicate that they belong to the same family. Further, it is a legal requirement for 
wife and daughter to carry the husbands and fathers names respectively which make easier to 
identify the family members.  Finally, on the basis on these two identification methods, we have 
used a binary variable for family firms, which is equal to one for family firms and zero otherwise.  
Control variables: Based on earlier corporate governance literature on board gender diversity we 
employed various board and firm level characteristics as control variables (Chakraborty et al., 
2018; Yamori et al., 2017; Sila et al, 2016; Levi et al, 2014; Dezso and Ross, 2012). These controls 
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include lag of dependent variable, board size, which is measured as total number of directors on 
the board, and board independence, that is measured as ratio of independent directors in relation 
to total number of directors. CEO duality which is one when CEO is also chairman of the board 
and zero otherwise. Market to book ratio is measured as market value of equity to book value of 
equity for firm, ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets 
Firm level controls include firm size, firm age, leverage, growth opportunities, and internal capital. 
Firm size is measured as logarithm of firm’s total assets and firm age is measured as number of 
years from its establishment. Growth opportunities are proxied by price earnings ratio. Internal 
financial resources or unobserved slack referred as slack, which readily available for firm to invest. 
Following previous studies, cash on hand available to firm is taken as slack (e.g., Kraatz and Zajac, 
2001).  
3.4. Method of estimation and model specification 
The issue of endogeneity is quite common in empirical research on board-diversity where the list 
of potential determinants can be large (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). For example, firm-level 
unobservable variables which represent time-invariant characteristics of firms such as corporate 
culture may affect firm risk-taking but is difficult to control in the analysis. Further, Huang and 
Kisgen (2013) pointed out that women are appointed on board under specific circumstances and 
not selected randomly. Risk taking firms may also not appoint women on risk taking positions due 
to high female risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy, 2009)  or women may self-select for firms which 
take less risk (Graham et al., 2013). Moreover, endogeneity concerns arise because of omitted 
unobservable firm characteristics (Willey and Monllor-Tormos, 2018). Omitted variables that 
affect both the selection of female directors and risk taking decisions could lead to spurious 
correlations between board gender diversity and risk taking variable. It is plausible, for example, 
that CEOs of high managerial ability may be more effective in managing risk, while at the same 
time having more influence over director’ appointment decisions in which they tend to be 
indifferent of the gender of potential director. Another example of omitted unobservable variable 
in the risk-board relationship is corporate social responsiveness (Sila et al., 2016). Socially 
responsible firms are perceived as less risky (as CSR activities reduces risk factors such as 
regulatory sanctions, customer boycotts etc.) and simultaneously they also appoint more female 
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directors to increase firm legitimacy.Keeping in view of above, it is mandatory to address the issue 
of endogeneity between gender and risk. 
To remove the endogeneity concerns studies on board gender diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Carter et al. 2010) have widely used fixed effect, two-stage least square and instrumental 
variable estimation techniques. Fixed effect alleviates the issue of unobservable heterogeneity 
however it cannot deal with time invariant variables (board gender diversity) in the data because 
fixed effect drops time-invariant observations (Wintoki et al., 2012). Two-stage least square 
method resolves the problem of endogeneity but itis dependent on the availability of the valid 
instrument. We employ instrumental variable technique, particularly first-differenced Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique (Arellano and Bond, 1991). GMM provides 
several benefits over other estimation techniques, as first difference eliminates the impact of time-
invariant variables on coefficient estimates. GMM utilizes lagged values of the variables as 
instruments. Lastly, GMM also deals with firm level heterogeneity, reverse causality and 
measurement errors occurred while employing orthogonal condition. For the reliability of GMM 
parameter estimates we conduct Sargan and AR (2) test as suggested by Arellano and Bond(1991). 
Sargan test provides the validity of the instrument and AR (2) test detects the serial correlation in 
the error structure. Rejection of the null hypothesis in both cases validates the GMM parameter 
estimates. 
Specific our model is a follows:   
           
  
= α+                           +       ℎ    ℎ        
+                ℎ     +                           ×    ℎ    ℎ         + 
                           ×              ℎ      + 
                           ×    ℎ    ℎ         ×              ℎ     + Control Variables +  
ε     ……… (1)
Subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ shows firm and year respectively. The β is the coefficient estimate of 
independent variables and subscript ‘ε’ represents error of the model. We control for year fixed 
effects in the both samples of high-tech and non-high tech sector, whereas industry effects are only 
controlled in the sample of non-high tech sector. We included five industry dummies on the basis 
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of two-digit level of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Two-digit SIC distributes non-
financial firms into 12 categories; however,following Campbell (1996) we reclassified industry 
groups to a narrower six industries. The main reason to use a few broad industry groups rather than 
more detailed groups is our relatively small number of sample size and lack of industrial diversity. 
Studies that use similar industrial classification include, among others, Saeed et al., (2016) and 
Skaggs et al. (2012). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics & Correlations  
Table 2 summarizes the summary statistics of the variables used in the study for our entire, high-
tech and control samples. The mean value of Altman’s Z-score (Inversed) is higher in high-tech 
firms (0.313) than in non-high-tech firms (0.296) and the difference is statistically insignificant. 
Mean difference for leverage is significant but higher for non-high tech firms may be due to the 
fact that high-tech firms mostly rely on internal resources for innovative projects. High-tech firms 
tend to have a higher mean value (0.026) of R&D than the value for non-high-tech firms (0.0115). 
This difference is strongly significant at the 1% level. Such higher value of R&D for high-tech 
sample is due the reason that within these firms, innovation is a key source of competitive 
advantage whereas for non-high-tech firms innovation is less critical for success.  Next, the 
difference across both samples for our main independent variable board gender (mean ratio of 
high-tech is 0.057 whereas for non-high tech sample is 0.056) is not statistically significant. The 
mean size (total assets) of firms in the high-tech sample is 22.91 and this value is 22.78 for control 
sample, while the difference between these values is statistically insignificant. Thus, the average 
firm size was comparable in the two samples. Mean difference between high-tech and non-tech 
samples for Market to book ratio is statistically insignificant.  CEO duality is more profound in 
Indian high-tech firms. Next, both board size and board independence do not differ across both 
samples. Interestingly, when compared with non-high tech firms, high-tech firms are slightly less 
profitable and have less growth opportunities. However, these differences are found statistically 
insignificant. Mean value of σROA is higher in high-tech firms (0.04) than in non-high-tech firms 
(0.03) and the difference is statistically significant.Finally, high-tech firms have a higher mean 
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value of capital expenditure and industry-adjusted R&D when compared with non-high-tech firms, 
showing pattern similar with R&D expenditure. This difference is statistically significant at 1% 
level.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents correlations among the variables used in this study. Notably there is negative and 
significant correlation between R&D expenditure and board gender diversity. High-tech firms are 
also positively correlated with R&D expenditure. In addition capital expenditure is also positively 
correlated with gender diversity. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4.2. Multivariate results
GMM regressions were performed. Three measures of risk taking are used, Altman’s Z-score 
(inversed), leverage and R&D expenditure. In the regression analysis, tests were also carried out 
for the reliability of the GMM estimates. The insignificant Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions with the null hypothesis that instruments are valid is not rejected shows that there is 
no correlation between the instrument and error term. Further, second-order serial correlation test 
values are also statistically insignificant suggesting that there is no threat of serial correlation in 
the analysis. Lastly, Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the independent variables 
provides support that all regressors included in the model are all jointly significant. All 
specifications include time dummies and industry dummies. 
We have used hierarchal regression for analysis in Table 4. We also show all results in a 
change mode as well by taking a difference of current and previous year (∆ = t-tt-1) for all dependent, 
independent and control variables. All regression models are followed by regressions for these 
change results as well.  We have estimated the effect of board gender diversity on firm risk-taking 
with control variables. Results reveals that coefficient of percentage of women on board has shown 
significant and negative impact on all firm risk-taking measures, namely, Altman’s Z-score, 
leverage and R&D expenditure. Next we rerun the same regression in addition with interactions. 
Hypothesis-1 predicts that there is positive relationship between board gender diversity and risk 
taking in high-tech firms. For this we have included two-way interaction term for board gender 
diversity and high-tech firms. Results reveals that coefficient of percentage of women on board 
has shown strong significant and positive impact on all risk-taking measures. In terms of economic 
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significance, given that each ten percent of women directors on the board corresponds to 
approximately one female director (as board size is approximately 10), so replacing one man with 
one woman on board would lead to an increase in risk taking in the form of Altman’s Z-score 
(Inversed) by 2.9%, leverage by 0.32%, and R&D expenditure by 0.15%. We have also included 
three-way interaction term for board gender diversity, high-tech firms and family firms to test the 
moderating impact of women on board in high-tech family firms which is our second hypothesis. 
The coefficient for three-way interaction term is found to be significant and negative which 
indicates that family ownership decreases the effect of board gender diversity on all risk taking 
measures. Results achieved for variables in change form (∆ = t-tt-1) are in agreement to our main f 
findings.      
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In an extended analysis to re-affirm our findings, we conduct the split sample analysis by splitting 
the main sample into two samples, high-tech and control samples. GMM regressions were 
performed for high-tech and control sample separately and results are presented in Table 5 for 
three main risk taking measures used in this study that is Altman’s Z-score (Inversed), leverage 
and R&D expenditure.  These results are also supplemented by change mode (∆ = t-tt-1).  Results 
reveal that coefficient of percentage of women on board has shown strong significant and positive 
impact on firm risk-taking (for all three measures) in high-tech sample. The findings strongly 
support our hypothesis (1) that predicts a positive relationship between firm risk-taking and board 
gender diversity in high-tech sample. We also add interaction term for family firms and board 
gender diversity to test the moderating impact of women on board in high-tech family firms which 
is our second hypothesis. The coefficient for interaction term is found to be significant and negative 
which indicates that family ownership decreases the effect of board gender diversity on firm’s risk 
taking. Result signifies that family firms negatively moderate the relationship between women 
directors and firm risk-taking and confirms our theoretical prediction of hypothesis (2). We extend 
the analysis to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking (in 
the form of Altman’s Z-score (Inversed), leverage, and R&D expenditure) for control sample. 
Same regression estimation routine is repeated for non-high-tech sector (control sample). Results 
reveal that negative and significant relationship is found between board gender diversity and firm 
risk-taking. It indicates that board-gender exert negative effect on firm risk-taking in non-high tech 
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sector. Similarly, we find negative moderating effect of family ownership on risk-taking and board 
gender diversity relationship, as the result for interacting term is also statistically significant.  
Taken together, our  empirical findings  indicate  that  the  hypothesized  positive 
relationship  between  board gender diversity and firm risk-taking exists  in the  high-tech sample. 
Similarly, moderating effect of family ownership on this relationship is also visible in high-tech 
sector. Thus, we may interpret our overall findings as business contingencies (contextual factors) 
play an important role in the determination of woman risk-taking propensity, and inferring the 
overall risk-taking behaviour of women directors without considering contextual requirements can 
be misleading.  
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3. Robustness tests 
We perform several sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our earlier results using model in 
Table 4 as our base model. Collectively, these additional tests, which are reported in Tables 6 and 
7, reinforce our earlier evidence. 
4.3.1. Alternative measures of firm risk-taking 
We have used two alternative measures for risk taking, standard deviation of ROA and capital 
expenditure. Standard deviation of ROA is largely used in the literature to measure the firm risk 
taking behavior (e.g. Sila et al., 2016; Miller & Triana, 2009; Miller and Bromiley, 1990). One 
can expect that if firm’s leverage and R&D expenditure increases it may also influence firm’s 
capital expenditure. As our descriptive statistics show similar pattern of R&D expenditure and 
capital expenditure in both high-tech and control samples, which leads us to use capital expenditure 
as firm alternative to R&D spending. Following Carter et al., (2015) and Sila et al., (2016) capital 
expenditure is measured as net capital expenditure divided by total assets. GMM regression is 
performed and results are reported in Panel A and B of Table-6. We conduct the regression analysis 
by using standard deviation of ROA (σROA) and capital expenditure as alternative risk measures. 
Results reveal that coefficient of two-way interaction of board gender diversity and high-tech firms 
exert a positive and statistically significant impact on risk taking. Whereas coefficient of three-
way interaction term shows a negative moderating impact of family firms on board gender 
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diversity.  These results are in agreement to our hypothesis 1 that women directors positively 
influence the risk in high-tech. Results reveals that the coefficient of three-way interactions term 
is significant and negative, which shows that board gender diversity decreases the risk in family 
firms.  
 [Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.3.2. Restricted definition of board gender diversity 
Thus far, we treat the women board membership as a homogenous group. However, research 
suggests that it is even difficult for women to get an executive board member position as compared 
to non-executive board membership and the effect of non-executive women directors on business 
decision making is very marginal (e.g. Sila et al., 2016). Hence, to examine the impact of women 
directors on risk-taking, we restrict our sample to only executive women directors. To this purpose, 
we use a narrower definition of board gender diversity as the number of women executive directors 
over board size (percentage of women executive directors on board). Results are presented in panel 
C of Table 6. The coefficient estimate on women director ratio is positive and significant in two-
way interaction term for board gender diversity and high-tech firms, suggesting that positive 
association between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking is not specific to women's 
executive or non-executive membership. Further, the coefficient on three-way interaction term is 
found negative and statistically significant indicating that moderating effect of family ownership 
on the relationship between board gender diversity and risk-taking holds even with more restricted 
definition of board gender diversity. 
4.3.3. Alternative estimation techniques-Heckman two-stage sample selection technique 
Although our estimation technique (GMM) helps mitigate concerns about the potential 
endogeneity of the board gender diversity, we further confront this matter using Heckman's two-
stage sample selection procedure (Heckman, 1979). This procedure include probit model in first 
stage a dummy variable indicating the likelihood of women presence on board (one for women on 
firm’s board and 0 otherwise) is regressed on same regressors used in the base analysis in addition 
to instrument, which distinguishes the probability of women appointment on board for firm. Our 
instrument variable is the ratio of male board members who sits on the other firm’s board which 
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comprises women. This reflects the female social network while appointing them on the boards. 
Instrument is previously used by Faccio et al. (2016) and Adam and Ferreira (2009), and is based 
on the notion of familiarity. In the second stage of the procedure we regress our dependent variable 
(risk) on all independent variables. Results are shown in Panel D of Table 6. Our findings are 
qualitatively similar to earlier results. Importantly, we find that Inverse Mills ratio is statistically 
not significant at conventional levels, thus we reject possible selection bias. In sum, our findings 
suggest that our results are independent of endogeneity issue. 
4.3.4. Industry-adjusted R&D expenditure  
We focus on the high-tech setting in this study to test whether board gender diversity affects firm 
risk taking measured as firm’s R&D expenditure. As high-tech sector is characterized by 
innovation and uncertainty, one can expect that higher expenditure on R&D is the industry norms 
in comparison to low technology sectors. We intend to examine whether or not having women on 
boards in high-tech sector challenge (deviate) the industry normswhich is higher R&D in high-
tech sector? To test this, we redefine the measure R&D expenditure as industry-adjusted R&D 
expenditure for risk taking and adjust the industrial effect on firm’s R&D expenditure. We classify 
industries on the basis of two-digit level of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). To compute 
industry-adjusted R&D expenditure, we first calculate the average of the R&D expenditure for 
each industry and then industry average R&D expenditure is taken away from the individual firm’s 
R&D expenditure. Results for industry-adjusted R&D expenditure are provided in the Panel E of 
Table 6.  Results are in agreement to our both hypotheses and robust to baseline findings which 
suggest women directors are risk taker in high-tech sector and family firms negatively moderate 
this relationship. 
4.3.5. Propensity score matching technique 
We extend robustness analysis for our baseline findings by employing propensity score matching 
technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) by using split sample that is high-tech and control 
samples. This approach eliminates the concern of self-selection and also provides more accurate 
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way to match the firms. This method allow us to match each firm in treatment group with the firm 
of approximate similar characteristics in control group except the only existing difference between 
the firms is “woman on board” (treatment group)and “all male board members”(control group). 
To execute this, we first estimate the propensity scores for both high-tech and control samples for 
firms with woman on board in the presence of same firm-level factors, which are controlled in the 
base line analysis in Table 4. Year fixed effects are included for both samples and industry effects 
are only included for control sample. Distribution of propensity scores is quite well overlapped in 
both samples but for exact match we allow only pairs of firms (one from treatment and one from 
control group) with the maximum absolute difference of 0.1% in propensity scores in both high-
tech and control samples. Then, we identify family firms with the woman on board and firms with 
all male board members within high-tech and control samples. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results for high-tech sample and shows that the average 
value of R&D expenditure (0.111) for firms with women on board is significantly higher than the 
R&D expenditure of (0.020) for firms with all male board members. The average Altman’s Z-
score (Inversed) 0.343 for firms having woman on board is also higher than the firms with all male 
board members (0.292). Average value of leverage (0.373) for firms with women on board is 
significantly higher than the leverage of (0.260) for firms with all male board members.  Results 
for average Altman’s Z-score (Inversed) and leverage is also significantly lower for firm with 
woman on board than firms with all male board members in family firms. Similarly, family firms 
shows that average value for R&D expenditure is (0.037) is significantly lower for firms with 
woman on board than for firms with all male board members (0.074). These findings are robust to 
our baseline findings and provide support to our both contentions that board gender diversity 
positively influences the firm risk taking in high-tech sample and family ownership negatively 
moderate this relationship. 
In contrast, Panel B presents results for control sample which shows that average values of 
R&D expenditure, Altman’s Z-score (Inversed) and leverage are significantly lower for firms with 
woman on board than the firms with all male board members. Similarly, family firms also exert 
negative impact on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk taking.  
4.4. Additional analysis 
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Considering the effect of female executives on risk-taking one step further, it is interesting to 
investigate the impact of female executives on firm performance in high-tech sector. To examine 
this question,we measure firm performance using an approximation of Tobin’s Q.  In particular, 
Tobin q is measured as market value of the equity plus book value of the debt divided by total 
assets. 
In Model (1) of table 3 we regress firm’s performance on board gender diversity without 
allowing control variables. Results reveal a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
board gender diversity at 1% in high-tech sample and a negative and significant coefficient in non-
high-tech sample. These results remain consistent even after introducing control variables in model 
(2) however, the magnitude of coefficients decreases. Findings of the high-tech firms are consistent 
with previous studies (Sarhan et al., 2018; Carter et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2010). Model (3) reports 
that family ownership negatively moderate the relationship between board gender diversity and 
firm’s market performance in both high-tech and non-high-tech sectors. However the statistical 
significance is achieved only for high-tech sector. In sum, our findings indicate that presence of 
women directors in high-tech sector reveals a positive influence on firm’s market performance.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study is conducted with the premise of women as risk taker. Traditionally, in literature gender 
diversity is positively related to firm innovation (Miller &Triana, 2009) and innovative projects 
are risky and unpredictable (Bernile et al, 2018; Holmstrom, 1989) for which we need managers 
who have higher risk appetite (Galasso& Simcoe, 2011). This theoretical conflict leads us to 
conduct the underlying study. Our base line results are in agreement to our hypothetical predictions 
that suggest that women directors are risk taker in high-tech firms and family firms negatively 
moderates the relationship between women director and firm risk-taking in high-tech firms. These 
results corroborate with the studies such as Adams and Funk (2012) which show that Swedish 
female top executives are less risk-averse than their male counterparts, and Berger et al., (2014) 
suggesting that women can be more aggressive than men when they work in more uncertain and 
risky environment. Our results provide a strong impetus to consider firm's contextual factors as 
managerial risk attitudes tend to vary over environments. 
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We can draw two important inferences from our study. Firstly, contingency perspective 
can serve as a valuable lens through which we can improve understanding of the heterogeneity in 
risk-taking behavior of directors in general and women directors in particular. Women director's 
attitude toward risk in high-tech sector is driven by her self-identification as a member of the 
salient category, female, which pressurises her to take risk in business decisions. We may also 
infer that business contextual factors play an important role in the determination of woman 
directors as risk averse or risk taker. Board directors' risk-taking appetite is embedded in the 
specific context in which firm operates. Secondly, various contextual factors may develop 
conflicting risk-taking tendencies within board directors, as ownership structure (family 
ownership) in our context inversely influences women directors' risk-taking attitude. Though our 
study does not involve comparative analysis of contextual factors to establish which factor is more 
prevailing however it strongly advocates the inclusion of contextual factors in research 
determining women directors' influence on firm risk-taking.  
Our findings further suggest that influence of board gender diversity on risk taking should 
be taken into account the contextual features. Positive association between women directors on the 
boards of high-tech firms and risk taking realizes that stakeholder of corporate governance may 
recognize the importance of distinct institutional pressures, such as number of female employees 
in an Indian high-tech sector and socio-cultural norms which encourage female enrolment in 
science and technology subjects in India. These institutional factors create an environment which 
accept, encourage and positively evaluate the presence of women in leadership positions. Our 
finding also suggests that presence of women directors for family owned and non-family owned 
high-tech firms are alike. The plausible reason could be that family firms even in the high-tech 
sector adopts nepotism to appoint women directors that may damage the potential advantage of 
women director in family owned high-tech firms .          
The results of our analysis support the business case for inclusion of women on corporate 
boards. Our study offers new insights to managers and policy makers that a gender diverse board 
is more incline to take risk in high-tech firms suggesting that women directors’ attitude toward 
risk is highly context-specific. This gives validity to gender equality policies that recently initiated 
in many countries, and obliges government to make efforts to clear the way for women to access 
board positions. As if a segment of society’s talent that makes up more than half of the population 
is barred from these boards, not because of talent but gender, then such boards are sub-optimal. 
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Another key implication of our findings is that studies that attempt to associate the director’s 
gender with corporate outcomes have to carefully consider the environment in which firm operates 
and decisions are made. 
To generalize the findings of this study to other countries requires caution as each country 
is subject to different regulatory and economic environment, cultural risk-preferences, the size of 
capital market and the effectiveness of governance mechanism. However, the findings can be 
relevant and generalised to economies characterised by similar socio-cultural and institutional 
setting, like China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.A natural extension of this study is to extend 
the scope of the study by including a number of countries which could facilitate a cross-country 
comparison of the impact of institutional and cultural differences on the relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm risk-taking. Further, to enhance our limited understanding of the subject, 
researchers must use moderators as moderation reveals how and why one variable affects another, 
it has taken a special place in organizational sciences (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
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Table 1: Two- digit Standard Industrial Classification  
Industry Two Digit- SIC 
Code 
Industry Two Digit- SIC 
Code 
1 Health Care/Pharmaceuticals 80 Manufacturing-Chemical 
Products 
28, 29 
2 Software/IT (including BPO-ITES Firms) 73 Manufacturing-Agriculture based 
Products. 
01,07, 22 
3 Telecommunication 48 Manufacturing-Construction 
equipment and material 
35 
4 Electronics 36 
5 Automobile 37 
High-tech sample Non-high-tech sample 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for key variable 
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
Full sample 
( firm-year observations 776) 
High-tech Sample 
(firm-year observations 394 ) 
Control sample 




Mean St. dev Min Max Mean St. dev Min Max Mean St. dev Min Max
Risk taking-R&D 0.019 0.064 
0.000 0.943 0.026 0.077 0.00 0.943 0.011 0.046 0.000 0.536 -0.015***
Risk taking-1/Z-score 0.325 0.212 0.012 0.909 0.296 0.294 0.012 0.016 0.313 0.450 0.58 0.909 -0.017
Risk taking-Leverage 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.72 0.008*
Board gender diversity 5.68 7.48 0.00 50.00 5.74 7.17 0.00 28.57 5.62 7.80 0.00 50.00
-0.11 
Family Ownership 0.485 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.47 0.00 1.00
-0.03 
CEO Duality 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00 -0.15***
Board size 9.36 2.79 3.00 17.00 9.36 2.8 3.00 16.00 9.35 2.78 4.00 17.00 -0.006
% Independent directors 0.53 0.10 0.00 0.85 0.55 0.11 0.06 0.85 0.52 0.10 0.00 0.77 -0.03**
Market-to-book 2.81 3.93 0.60 5.52 2.44 1.78 1.45 4.17 3.19 2.07 0.45 5.52 0.75
Firm size 22.85 1.56 18.70 27.34 22.91 1.58 18.70 27.34 22.78 1.54 19.10 27.30 -0.12
Firm Age 36.85 25.11 6.00 149 29.34 15.19 6.00 78.00 44.55 30.42 9.00 149.0 15.21***
Slack -3.15 1.66 -8.18 10.14 -3.02 1.51 -7.39 1.57 -3.31 1.79 -8.18 10.14 -0.29***
Growth opportunities 13.09 19.09 -21.44 40.29 12.85 19.977 -21.44 30.845 13.33 18.18 -15.76 40.29 0.47
σ ROA 0.03 0.06 -0.004 0.67 0.04 0.071 0.00 0.595 0.03 0.06 -0.004 0.67 -0.001*
Capital expenditure 0.064 0.181 0.000 0.693 0.066 0.152 0.000 0.487 0.010 0.195 0.000 0.693 -0.0650***
Industry-adjusted R&D -0.023 0.076 0.000 0.798 0.046 0.090 0.000 0.798 0.004 0.046 0.000 0.524 0.046*** 
Tobin’s Q 2.45 8.05 0.001 27.78 1.78 0.74 0.23 12.22 3.14 11.30 0.001 27.78 1.36**
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Table: 3 Correlations 
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 












-0.03 0.00 1.00 
4 Leverage -0.04 0.03 0.00 1.00 




0.04 0.10** -0.02 -0.02 0.45 1.00 
7 Firm Size 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12* 1.00 
8 Firm Age -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.22* -0.17* 0.34** 1.00 
9 ROA -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.10* -0.06 1.00 








-0.02 0.06* 0.00 0.19** -0.08** -0.06 -0.05 0.07* 0.10** 0.00 0.07** 1.00 
13 CEO Duality -0.03 -0.01* -0.03 0.05 0.15** 0.18* -0.07* -0.01 -0.07* -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 1.00 




-0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.10** 0.02 -0.23* -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.19** -0.05 1.00 
16 Tobin’s Q 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.14** 0.03 -0.02 0.08** 0.04 0.45** 0.03 0.21** 0.56* -0.08** 0.11* -0.04 1.00 




0.02 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.07* 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.26 0.02** 1.00  
19 Ind-Adj R&D -0.03 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.24* -0.04 0.72** 0.23* 0.23* 0.00 -0.02 0.09* -0.02 0.27* -0.11* 0.24* 0.09* 0.04 1.00 
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Table 4: Board Gender Diversity and Risk Taking 
Panel A Panel B  Panel C 
R&D ∆ = t-tt-1 R&D ∆ = t-tt-1  Z-score-1 ∆ = t-tt-1 Z-score-1 ∆ = t-tt-1  Leverage ∆ = t-tt-1 Leverage ∆ = t-tt-1





















































































































































































































































































































































Board Gender diversity × 














No. of Observations 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776

















































Wald Test 0.018 0.015 0.024 0.038 0.011 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.0001 0.0001 0.071 0.05
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
36 
Table 4-Panel A, B and C reports our base line results by employing GMM regression analysis along with results in a change mode as well. In Panel A dependent Variable, firm risk taking 
measured R&D expenditure and in Panel B dependent variable, firm risk taking measured as Altman’s Z-Score (Inversed), in Panel C dependent Variable, firm risk taking measured as Leverage. 
All specification includes Time dummies and Industry dummies are included. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions with under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term, p-values are reported in the brackets. AR-2 is a test of second-order serial correlation. Wald test shows the joint significance of reported coefficients, p-value is 
reported.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1.
37 
Table -5 reports base line results by using split sample analysis of high-tech and control samples along with results in a change mode as well.  In Panel A dependent Variable, firm risk taking 
measured as R&D expenditure and in Panel B dependent variable, firm risk taking measured as Altman’s Z-Score (Inversed), in Panel C dependent Variable, firm risk taking measured as 
Leverage. All specification includes time dummies where industry dummies are included for control sample. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions with under the null hypothesis 
Table 5: Board Gender Diversity and Risk Taking
Panel A Panel B Panel C
High-Tech Sample Control Sample High-Tech Sample Control Sample High-Tech Sample Control Sample 
R&D ∆ = t-tt-1 R&D ∆ = t-tt-1  Z-score-1 ∆ = t-tt-1 Z-score-1 ∆ = t-tt-1  Leverage ∆ = t-tt-1 Leverage ∆ = t-tt-1



























































































































































































































































































































No. of Observations 394 382 394 382 394 382 394 382 394 382 394 382 

















































Wald Test 0.001 0.041 0.034 0.022 0.001 0.054 0.046 0.012 0.001 0.071 0.047 0.001
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
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of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, p-values are reported in the brackets. AR-2 is a test of second-order serial correlation. Wald test shows the joint significance of 
reported coefficients, p-value is reported. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 6 reports robustness tests for our base line results. Panel (A) employing standard deviation of Return on Assets as an alternative measure of firm risk-taking, Panel (B) employing capital 
expenditure as an alternative measure of firm risk-taking, In Panel (C) we use a restricted definition of board gender diversity which is a fraction of executive female director divided by total 
number of directors on board and dependent variable is R&D Expenditure. Panel (D) presents the second-stage regression results of Heckman two-stage estimation, dependent variable is R&D 
Expenditure. In Panel (E) we use industry-adjusted R&D expenditure as dependent variable. All specification includes time dummies and industry dummies are included. Sargan is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions with under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, p-values are reported in the brackets. AR-2 is a test of second-order 
serial correlation. Wald test shows the joint significance of reported coefficients, p-value is reported. Inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the first-stage regression of the Heckman two-stage 
procedure. It is insignificant indicating that there is no problem of selection bias. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at1%.
Table 6: Robustness Tests
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Alternative measure of 
risk-taking 
(σ ROA)
Alternative measure of 
risk-taking 
(Capital Expenditure)
Restricted definition of 








































Board Gender diversity ×  











Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.641 
(1.281)
No. of Observations 776 776 776 776 776

















Wald Test 0.001 0.035 0.041 0.005
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table-7: Propensity Scores Matching
Risk Taking Measure Mean 
Mean Difference  
(Woman on board –  
All male board members)
P-Value  
Panel A-High-tech sample
R&D Expenditure -Woman on board 0.111 
0.091** 0.011 
R&D Expenditure -All male board members 0.020
Z-score-1-Woman on board 0.343
0.051* 0.052 
Z-score-1-All male board members 0.292
Leverage -Woman on board 0.373
0.113* 0.071 
Leverage -All male board members 0.260
No. of Observations 318 
Family Firms
R&D Expenditure -Woman on board 0.037
-0.036** 0.0481 
R&D Expenditure -All male board members 0.074
Z-score-1-Woman on board 0.261 
-0.268** 0.0261 
1 Z-score-1-All male board members 0.529 
Leverage -Woman on board 0.443
-0.124* 0.071 Leverage -All male board members 0.567 
No. of Observations 173
Panel B-Control sample
R&D Expenditure -Woman on board 0.005
-0.003*** 0.001 R&D Expenditure -All male board members 0.009 
Z-score-1-Woman on board 0.334 
-0.165* 0.076 Z-score-1-All male board members 0.499 
Leverage -Woman on board 0.331
-0.336*** 0.000 Leverage -All male board members 0.667 
No. of Observations 306 
Family Firms
R&D Expenditure –Woman on board 0.004
-0.009* 
0.0687 
R&D Expenditure -All male board members 0.013
Z-score-1-Woman on board 0.284 
-0.339* 0.084 
Z-score-1-All male board members 0.623 
Leverage -Woman on board 0.492
-0.091** 0.043 Leverage -All male board members 0.583 
No. of Observations 161 
Table 7: reports robustness test for our base line results by employing Propensity Score Matching. Propensity scores 
are estimated using  firm level factors  used in our baseline analysis with year fixed effects for both high-tech sample 
and control sample and industry effects are included for control sample only .Panel (A) provide results for high-tech 
sample and Panel (b) provide results for control sample with. Risk Taking is measured as R&D expenditure, Altman’s 
Z-Score (Inversed) and Leverage with firms with their mean difference and P- value for mean difference. *Significant 
at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Impact of board gender diversity on firm performance 
High-tech sample Control sample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 














































































No. of Observations 394 394 394 382 382 382
























Wald Test 0.006 0.091 0.040 .0001 0.077 0.0143
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 8 reports the results of additional analysis by employing GMM regression for high-tech and control samples. Dependent Variable is firm performance 
measured as Tobin’s q and independent variables remain same as in baseline analysis. All specification includes time dummies whereas industry dummies are 
included only in non-high-tech sample. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions with under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term, p-values are reported in the brackets. AR-2 is a test of second-order serial correlation. Wald test shows the joint significance 
of reported coefficients, p-value is reported. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1.
